

REBUTTAL

Rebuttal #2 to Dr. Perlo on Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Appeals¹

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I. Introduction: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism?

Dr. Perlo has been good enough to offer a reply to my critique of her article on intrinsic and extrinsic arguments for animal advocacy. I very much like how she ended up with her penultimate sentence: "...my goal is the same as Dr. Sztybel's: to end, as soon as possible, the human-inflicted suffering and untimely death of animals." Here there is a shared goal and a hearty commitment to carrying it out, as a movement, to maximum effect. That is, I assume—to pay homage to the obvious—that we cannot end speciesism as soon as possible without maximum effectiveness. I appreciate the expression of solidarity and applaudingly return the sentiment.

I will not attempt to recapitulate all of her article or my reply, but will presuppose some working knowledge of both, while providing some refreshers. She entitles her reply to my critique, "Fundamentalism or Pragmatism?" However, the title puzzles me in light of what she writes in that same article. I earlier wondered if she was an animal rights fundamentalist, referring back to my article in this journal, "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism" (see this article for a refutation, in effect, of a fundamentalist exclusion of extrinsic appeals). The fundamentalists will not tolerate a certain amount of deviation from animal rights in laws they are prepared to support, whereas the animal rights pragmatists advocate animal rights laws for the long-term, but are prepared to accept animal "welfarist" laws in the short-term that merely

¹ The original article by Katherine Perlo "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments: Strategies for Promoting Animal Rights" can be found in *JCAS* Volume V, Issue 1 (2007). The opening dialogue between David Sztybel "Response to Katherine Perlo's "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments: Strategies for Promoting Animal Rights" and Katherine Perlo "Fundamentalism or Pragmatism?" can be found in *JCAS* Volume VI, Issue I (2008).

reduce animal suffering while not ensuring animal rights in any strong sense. Dr. Perlo has indicated that she could support some “welfarist” reforms. Therefore she is not an animal rights fundamentalist. It follows that she cannot consistently and indeed does not use animal rights fundamentalism as a support for her position against extrinsic appeals, since she disowns fundamentalism in the other context of evaluating kinds of possible legislative reforms. So the fundamentalism versus pragmatism distinction cannot intelligibly serve as a key distinction in this debate, and is more of a side-bar. That is why I am puzzled she chose that for her title. At the same time I do believe that Dr. Perlo is correct in, like me, seeking to assess legislative and other advocacy strategies for their *pragmatic* value. In posing the question, “Fundamentalism or Pragmatism?,” obviously her decision is: pragmatism. We agree on that at a general level, but specifically we disagree on which strategy is the *most* pragmatic.

II. Formulating Terms for this Debate

I suppose we need to come up with new language, other than fundamentalism and pragmatism, in fact, to be clear about what we are discussing. This language is heavily indebted to Dr. Perlo’s own phrasing. First, by way of review of Dr. Perlo’s valuable distinction, because it is so crucial, an *intrinsic appeal* for animal rights is one that utilizes a moral theory or ideology of animal rights. It is called “intrinsic” presumably because it is based “in” animal rights itself. An *extrinsic appeal* for animal rights advocacy would not be based in animal rights, but in something “outside” animal rights discourse in the strict sense, such as the consideration that meat-eating is unhealthy, or that vivisection is incompetent science, to invoke two prominent examples. I propose, accordingly, that there are three general kinds of strategy here:

- (1) **intrinsic strategy** – this is Dr. Perlo’s stance. It means that animal rights campaigns should only use intrinsic arguments, and not include extrinsic strategies even as prominent supplements. However, she grants that if people are concerned, we can indeed reassure them that vegetarianism is healthy and that anti-vivisectionist research does work. We can even proactively build such

reassurances into our campaign, we newly learn in her response.

- (2) **extrinsic strategy** – this stance rather cynically holds that we should not invoke animal rights arguments at all, and only use extrinsic appeals, presumably because the public would otherwise cease listening to us. I have met such advocates.
- (3) **intrinsic-extrinsic strategy** – this is a mixed stance, reflective of my own view. I believe we should use intrinsic arguments, centrally in most contexts, but that it is often prudent on behalf of the animals to point out extrinsic arguments as well.

III. An Argument for the Intrinsic-Extrinsic Strategy

I am now going from the defensive not to the offensive, but rather to being *assertive* concerning the intrinsic-extrinsic strategy. In the following I present my justification of the intrinsic-extrinsic strategy from a best caring perspective, the theory that I articulate in other works. That said, most any commitment to the best will do in this case...

1. Intrinsic arguments are needed for animal rights advocates since we will never achieve animal rights—the animals' just due—without being *assertive* about them. The sooner we are proactive about animal rights, the quicker and stronger the realization of such rights. An extrinsic strategy would miss the people who might be influenced by intrinsic appeals. (This is a sketch of a reply to the extrinsic strategists.)
2. Best caring claims that the best ethic will advocate what is best for each and every sentient being. Anything else is a worse ethic. (No, I am not a utilitarian. See my essay earlier in this journal, "The Rights of Animal Persons.")
3. The best means the most good and the least bad.

4. Some people will be won over by intrinsic arguments, which is ideal.
5. Less ideally, some people will not be convinced by intrinsic arguments (alone), but may only adopt vegetarianism because (at least as an essential part of the given reasoning) meat-eating is a disaster in terms of health, the environment, and other factors, and may only adopt anti-vivisection since (at least as an essential part of the reasons given) vivisection is so useless and dangerously misleading.
6. The people convinced only under condition of accepting extrinsic arguments (who may—importantly—thus become more receptive to intrinsic arguments at a later time) will lead lives that mean more good and less bad for animals, because they will not create (as much of) a demand for slaughtering, and make it more likely that a given democracy will ban vivisection in the future, or otherwise frustrate the harmful activities of vivisectioners in particular cases.
7. Therefore extrinsic arguments are straightforwardly part of what is best, since there would be significantly less good and more bad for animals without them.

Now this argument, I affirm, consists only of true statements. (Recall that Dr. Perlo herself concedes there has been some effectiveness attributable to extrinsic appeals—a proposition anyone would contest to the peril of their argumentative stance.) Furthermore, the logical implications, it seems to me, are air-tight. I do not see how anyone could possibly refute the above argument, and I assert that Dr. Perlo has done nothing to show that any of these statements are false, nor anything to illuminate that the logical implication given in 7. is somehow a case of jumping to conclusions (not that the above argument was available to her, but the general intrinsic-extrinsic position has been on the table for three “episodes” in our series now). She would have to refute this argument to make good her position, but I doubt she can do this.

She wrote in her response that she can “reassure” people, even proactively, that vegetarianism is healthy and that medical research can progress without harming. Does this mean that she will cover the same material as extrinsic or intrinsic-extrinsic strategists, thus rendering this dispute purely academic? By no means. First of all, such material is explicitly de-emphasized by Dr. Perlo. Second, one can reassure people that vegetarianism is healthy without educating people about the ills of meat-eating, bearing in mind that the latter are highly motivating for people. Similarly, one can list viable forms of medical research that do not involve vivisection without illuminating how vivisection itself is so lacking in utility and promotive of harms. So missing the enormous truth-value and activist-value of extrinsic appeals is something very much at stake here, and the animals simply cannot afford us turning a blind eye to such means if we are to have their best interests in mind.

I taught animal liberation courses in the Fall of 2008 at Brock University, and I had an extensive unit on animals used as food. Many students were not moved by animal rights arguments, although some were. However, some were swayed by a fear of, say, cancer (40% more for flesh-eaters, says a facts sheet for the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine) or global warming (18% caused by animal agriculture, which exceeds that resulting from all forms of human transport combined, according to a U.N. committee²). Learning such valuable facts helped to transform the lifestyles of some students in pro-vegetarian ways by their own admission. This figures into my argument that such extrinsic appeals result in more good and less harm not only for nonhuman animals, but indeed for human animals too. I point out additionally that being swayed “extrinsically” will mean less practical resistance to intrinsic arguments since there is no longer the problem of a conflict between vested interests and being interested in doing the right thing. After all, people ignoring, dismissing, or belittling animal rights arguments because they want to go on eating “their meat” is a huge problem in the experience of all animal rights activists.

² See the United Nations Food and Agriculture Associations’s *FAO Newsroom* for details regarding the FAO’s 2006 report at: <http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2006/1000448/index.html>

Consider relevant statistics about peoples' reasons for becoming vegetarian. *The Vegetarian Times* surveys vegetarians in order to obtain statistics about Americans in particular.³ In a 2008 poll, it was revealed that reasons for turning to vegetarianism include:

<i>Figure 1.</i>	
reasons for choosing vegetarianism	%
1. animal welfare	54
2. overall health	53
3. environmental concerns	47
4. natural approaches to wellness	39
5. food safety	31
6. weight loss	25
7. weight maintenance	34

This is a virtual tourist's guide of reasons with which to equip audiences potentially interested in vegetarian-related issues. Notice that most of these concerns are "extrinsic," to use Perlo's terminology. Yes, most of the people who change do so for directly animal-related reasons, but it is far from an overwhelming majority. Perlo's strategy suggests that the 46% of people who might switch to vegetarianism for "extrinsic" reasons not directly regarding animals, based on these figures, should essentially be passed by as insufficiently significant, their potential benefits for the animals—who as a consequence would be left in peace—fit to be ignored. I will be honest in declaring that Perlo's supposed "strategy" for best reducing animal suffering and death—through essentially "de-commisioning" these extrinsic reasons in discourse—is utterly absurd.

Keep in mind too that the survey is somewhat unrevealing as to how many people change for an accumulation of reasons. Animal welfare is only one. It may also be the case that a large percentage of those who cite concern for animal welfare would not have made the change unless

³ See the website of the *Vegetarian Times* for a page entitled "Vegetarianism in America" at http://www.vegetariantimes.com/features/archive_of_editorial/667. Retrieved September 9, 2009.

there were added on human-centered concerns such as human health and the human environment. Indeed, note that 54% change because of concern for animal welfare, and 53% change for overall health reasons. These add up to 7% more than 100%—and indeed the grand total of the lot is 283%—so people must commonly base their switch on a variety of reasons. It is therefore hard to make an absolute separation between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” reasons in terms of overall motivation for decisive action, even if all of the factors are conceptually distinct. It is not purely a case of either-or.

Statistics as to how many people turn anti-vivisectionist for scientific and/or ethical reasons would also be instructive. However, I have never come across such data, and nor have numerous academic experts and activist societies in the field of anti-vivisection whom I have consulted for this paper.⁴ The consensus from those I wrote to is that most anti-vivisectionists are so for ethical reasons. That matches my own perceptions. However, it must be borne in mind that speciesism is very common, and as a result, many people would not care about animals enough to spare them from vivisection if they thought that it could benefit humanity. Such multitudes of people, then, would be more interested in the scientific aspects. Dr. Katy Taylor, Scientific Coordinator of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, e-mailed me back regarding my inquiry for this paper on March 4, 2009, informing us: “There are statistics that scientists are more persuaded by scientific rather than ethical arguments.” She did not have the statistics on-hand, but I have no reason to doubt the truth of the generality which she has gleaned over the course of her extensive anti-vivisectionist career as researcher, writer, and activist. The finding should not reflect a surprising tendency, since scientists are often dismissive of ethical appeals and are commonly pro-vivisection, but for obvious reasons can ill afford to neglect scientific

⁴ Among others: Stephen Kaufman of the Medical Research Modernization Committee; Kenneth Shapiro of the Animals and Society Institute who works extensively on this issue; Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine; American Anti-Vivisection Society; National Anti-Vivisection Society; New England Anti-Vivisection Society; British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection; and The Hans Ruesch Centre, a group that Dr. Perlo would not approve of, which is devoted to the scientific refutation of vivisection modeled on works by Hans Ruesch such as, especially, *Slaughter of the Innocent* (Civitas, 1983). Many followers of Ruesch have been extrinsic strategists solely—the polar opposite of Perlo’s approach—and could be haranguing towards anyone who would use ethical arguments against vivisection. However, in 1993, at a conference organized by Gary Francione and Tom Regan at Rutgers University, called “A New Generation for Animal Rights,” a Rueschian whose name I cannot recall presented and apologized for his people having a history of attacking activists who would use moral argumentation against animal experimentation.

arguments. Vivisectors and their friends have a stranglehold over controlling what happens in animal research, so not appealing to their most receptive side—the scientific—is once again absurd if we are aiming for the *best* strategic approach. We must conclude overall that the scientific arguments alone—which are indeed convincing to many—are of inestimable value in swaying considerable numbers of speciesists.

I do not see how anyone could possibly negate the above logically and empirically based arguments. It is really a scientific, cumulative argument (at least granted the assumption that our intention is to avoid the most animal suffering and death as Dr. Perlo implies). In a way, I think it is also sufficient to decide this whole question, given the lack of logical space for discounting extrinsic appeals in genuinely seeking what is best. However, to be fair to Dr. Perlo, I will have to consider her points of rebuttal to my critique of her intrinsic strategy. We will see that her own differences with the full-spectrum approach are not scientifically justified at all but really are driven by numerous logical fallacies and ignored outcomes. But first let us attend to...

IV. Points That Dr. Perlo Neglected

First, I will note refutations I made in my critique which she does not even address in her response. This is significant because I have argued for all of my points of rebuttal. The thing about arguments is that they stand unless or until they can be refuted, and failing even to address my arguments entitles me to think that I have refuted her points on the relevant scores unless she or someone else will show otherwise. These points of hers that I have explicitly refuted include:

- (1) Extrinsic appeals consign animal rights to a marginal or extreme position.
- (2) Extrinsic appeals “disown” animal rights.
- (3) Extrinsic appeals presuppose a double-standard in that we would never use them in

advocating on behalf of humans.

- (4) Extrinsic appeals do not “stick to the subject,” and we cannot win the debate about animal rights by talking about something else.
- (5) Extrinsic appeals such as regarding vegetarianism and anti-vivisection are separable from intrinsic appeals (actually, *Figure 1* in the present paper gives the lie to this assertion in the context of overall motivation to become vegetarian).
- (6) Extrinsic appeals involve inconsistency or a concession to speciesism.
- (7) Extrinsic appeals suggest that animal-related considerations are not important enough to make the case on their own.
- (8) Avoiding extrinsic appeals and embracing only intrinsic appeals is more “honest.”

Now this listing is significant since I enumerated twelve arguments that she uses in favor of what I call the intrinsic strategy approach, and I have just documented that she does not even consider my rebuttals to eight of these arguments, or two-thirds of them—a solid majority. Has she disowned these earlier arguments? Does she suddenly consider them not worth attending to after asserting them in a scholarly work? Does she somehow consider my rebuttals to be unworthy of consideration? It is not clear, but in any case, her failure to address my refutations of these earlier claims is a significant part of my case in this current phase of the discussion, and will figure into my final summation of “the state of the debate.” Dr. Perlo indicated that she would not address my points in the order that I made them because she states that this would lead to repetition. However, I must confess my incomprehension as to how addressing the points in the order that I gave must somehow lead to repetition, since they are all distinctive issues. In this current piece, I will once again use the order of points from my earlier response so that the reader can more easily verify what she has responded to, and what she mostly neglects.

V. Addressing Dr. Perlo's Attempted Rebuttals

Now I will rebut rebuttals. My level of detail is due to the fact that I think this whole strategic question is very important. Therefore, I do not wish to neglect any aspects that may be involved in persuading someone one way or the other. Now the following enumeration of contested rebuttals is new and does not correspond to numbers used in earlier articles:

1. I interpreted that Dr. Perlo would only deploy extrinsic considerations, say, about vegetarianism, if people happen to ask. She replies by pointing out that peoples' questions can be anticipated and answered in advance. That seems to me dead-right. She warns, however:

...there is a significant difference between that [reassuring people that vegetarianism is healthy] and 'Another reason for going vegan is that it will make you healthier.' The first statement has the subtext 'You may be, understandably, wondering about this'; the second: 'I've got to offer some additional positive incentive.'

A few things. First, of course there is a difference in these types of statements, and the first is indeed consistent with the intrinsic strategy and the second might not be. But what does it mean to say, in effect, "I need to offer an additional incentive"? She does not really clarify this, but it would be useful to do so. It could be saying (a) I need to offer an additional incentive otherwise I will not be able to convince you; or (b) I need to offer an additional consideration because you might not be won over by the intrinsic appeal and I at least need to see if you can reduce your damage to animal lives after considering a mixed appeal. I would agree that we do not need to always agree with (a); it is sometimes false since some *are* convinced by animal rights arguments. Unfortunately, (a) seems to be true in some individual cases involving stubborn, selfish, or prejudiced folk—or others who are operating

in good faith but are simply not convinced. However, Dr. Perlo has not refuted (b), which relates to my whole argument (see above) for the mixed approach. She is begging the question, which means assuming what she needs to *justify*.

2. I took issue with her statement, “To hurt or kill animals is wrong, regardless of any other considerations,” by citing self-defense against bears for example. She concedes the point, indicating that her “statement was in the context of debate with supporters of animal abuse.” That is irrelevant, because my qualification applies not only to debates with speciesists, but also debates with critical anti-speciesists. Anyone, anytime, anywhere, anyhow should avoid anything like such oversimplifications in academic writing, in my opinion. Liberationists too must sometimes unhappily choose between inevitable harms.

3. I wrote that if extrinsic appeals result in less killing of animals and less suffering, then intrinsic concerns of animal rightists may partly be won by extrinsic appeals, and that helping animals is therefore part of “the subject” of animal rights. Her reply? “Both these statements equivocate between intrinsic *argument* and intrinsic *concerns*. An extrinsic argument that serves an intrinsic concern is still an extrinsic argument.” To be clear, I am not saying otherwise. If health arguments for vegetarianism further intrinsic concerns for longevity and freedom from suffering, those arguments are still extrinsic. But they are still “part of the subject” of animal rights since anyone interested in animals’ rights to life and freedom from avoidable suffering should be interested in all substantial means towards these ends. I am not trying to confuse the categories together as she implies with her charge of equivocation. I agree that intrinsic *concerns* extend to extrinsic appeals, which is indeed part of my whole point. She does not seem to perceive how animal rights concerns lead to an affirmation of using extrinsic appeals to reduce animal suffering and death. This whole point 3. relates to my earlier overall argument that my approach does more good and prevents more bad than hers. She has done nothing to refute this. Equivocation means that I am illicitly confusing two things

together, but I affirm that I am correct in saying “extrinsic appeals” which is also her very own language. To say that I am arguing that using extrinsic arguments are really somehow part of intrinsic arguments is an unwarranted misunderstanding of my position, and I never state nor imply this. We need to keep these types of arguments analytically distinct and I have always done so. I am only saying that intrinsic concerns invite a mixed strategy, and Dr. Perlo seems to be unaware that this is being argued, or else unconcerned to rebut it. But she should be.

4. Consider here Dr. Perlo’s response to my rebuttal of her point that the audience will suspect an ulterior motive and infer loss of credibility from intrinsic-extrinsic strategy use. (She still maintains this in her response.) I said that people will often not think ill, but grant that extrinsic appeals are being used to make things better for animals. However, to say there would be lack of credibility implies that my argument for the intrinsic-extrinsic strategy is somehow questionable or flawed. I remind the reader that, to date, Dr. Perlo has said nothing that even remotely refutes the argument either by showing that it contains false statements or fallacies of inference. She is begging the question once again.
5. Recall her statement that the mixed strategists “confuse” people by saying that vivisection does not work because animals are *different*, but animals deserve rights because they are *similar*. I pointed out that the first is due to physiological differences, but that does not mean that animals of different species lack the psychological similarity of sentience. But I might even add here that animals’ psychological differences render them scientifically unsound models for human psychology, even given the shared psychological trait of sentience. Similarity for moral purposes and differences for scientific modeling purposes are entirely different areas of difference and similarity, and one would indeed have to be confused in the first place to be confounded by the mixed strategists’ use of the argument that we cannot extrapolate experimental results from one species to another. However, even in a single area of comparison, such as comparing two

nations' coins, there may be both similarities and differences without incoherence. In her response, she has failed to rebut my point that no "confusion" or "conflicting claims" need be interpreted. Once again she begs a point at issue.

6. She adds that "...the public is smart enough to be suspicious of statistics and expert pronouncements that seem just too convenient for the promoters of an ethical cause." Convenient? Is she implying that the extensive literature showing that vivisection does not work is printed up just because it is "convenient" to do so? Let the audience be suspicious of such anti-vivisectionist claims. Let them research it. They will find convincing evidence that vivisection is a failed methodology, or so I and many others warrant. If Dr. Perlo does not wish to invoke such literature or disagrees with it, that is her privilege, although I doubt she has grounds to do so in the final analysis. She says the audience will wonder how selective is the information, and what other experts have said, whether differences are enough to discount results. True. But I say: so what? Arguments being complex does not mean they should be discarded. All of science involves the kinds of sophisticated questions that Dr. Perlo anticipates. Would she then say we should discard all of science because it is too complicated? If not, then we should not discard the part of science that pertains to vivisection's counter-utility. Such extrinsic appeals do not always make a convenient sound-bite, but I can tell you citing a study showing that 95% of drugs tested as safe and effective on animals were discarded at human clinical trials⁵ will have a great effect. I know this from an anti-vivisection talk I delivered that was mainly about animal rights ethics. The statistic just mentioned was the one thing that most stuck in the mind of one listener, according to him.

7. I point out that it is not always possible to erase species prejudices, or to change public policy using animal rights arguments. Dr. Perlo responds by stating that

⁵ Sharpe, R. (1988) *The Cruel Deception: The Use of Animals in Medical Research* (Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Thorsons Publishers Limited), p. 90, citing McMahon, F. I. *Medical World News* (1968): 6.

mixed strategists, she thinks, will not denounce speciesism “often enough, prominently enough, or analytically enough to cause people to re-examine their thinking.” It is possible to find this remark insulting, as implying that intrinsic-extrinsic theorists lack the ability to be as “analytical,” or that we are not diligent about advocating animal rights. If she bothered to elaborate, however, I think she might have said that communication opportunities are limited and because mixed strategists have more to get across, they will go less into depth and perhaps miss the chance to broach animal rights altogether on occasion. There is *some* sense to this thought. However, it does not take much effort to list different reasons for vegetarianism at a general level, and dedicated talks or writings can lavish focus on all of the relevant aspects. If it serves the best for sentient beings to address a spectrum of issues, ways can be and have been found to educate people in these matters and to communicate effectively. I turn the tables here though. Her approach *guarantees* that extrinsic appeals will not be voiced often enough, prominently enough, or with any kind of depth since it is her intention largely to *omit* such appeals from animal advocacy and education. (What immediately follows her seventh point here are some remarks by Dr. Perlo that do not decisively bear on the debate at hand, and so I will not refer to them here.)

8. She earlier argued that animals do not care about extrinsic appeals, and I rejoined that these nonhumans might not care about PETA’s slogans either but they are significant. Dr. Perlo’s rejoinder?

Saying that animals don’t care about human-centered concerns is a way of saying that their interests are more important to them than human interests, so that if they could understand the issues they would not care about the non-animal concerns, but they would care about PETA’s slogans.

She concedes the animals would care about PETA’s slogans. Is this because they are animal rights slogans? My point is that the animals, even if they could care

“only” about what impacts them, *should* also care about extrinsic appeals because it is best for *anyone* concerned about animals to do so as I have argued. I do not even concede her phrasing that extrinsic factors are necessarily “non-animal concerns,” since they are very much of concern and connection regarding animals—although I do get her meaning. Again, Dr. Perlo has not refuted the key point at issue here.

9. She says extrinsic appeals involve more uncertainty and remoteness. I indicated by way of rebuttal that it is *certain* that meat-eating is a health/environmental disaster, and that vivisection is not very useful. I pointed out that even animal rights arguments often refer to animals who are remote from us, or who may not even come to exist thanks to our boycotts, etc. Her point of reply, rather than addressing my points directly (yet another case of un rebutted arguments), is that people might want to eat a little meat because that might not be unhealthy. That is an important point and it is true. However, why is the reduction of animal-product-consumption by degrees somehow insignificant? Additionally, she cannot ignore the significance of health vegetarians who go all the way, and they are legion. She points out that many people will not be convinced “in their hearts” that green actions by individuals are going to matter. Again, it is true that *some* people are like that. But she ignores the multitudes of environmentalist vegetarians or meat-eating-reducers out there. Turning a blind eye thus is perilous to her position. It merely *ignores* that the mixed approach reduces harm and increases benefits by trying to shift the focus to selective cases in which such appeals fail. She points out that many people are unconvinced by vivisection-does-not-work arguments and that industry and government rebut such arguments. True again. But once more, she ignores the huge swaths of the public, including medical experts, who find such arguments persuasive. What are we to make of a debater’s arguments which only focus on the negative and rigorously avoid any fair consideration of the positive? It is called undue bias and begging the question, among other applicable labels. Should we discard ethical arguments too because they sometimes do not

work? I do not think so, and neither does Dr. Perlo.

10. She disowns the fundamentalist position explicitly in her response—so why does she make this part of the title? In any event, she claims that:

...too great a reliance on human-centered supports weakens the great potential of the liberationist case for helping animals, and is thus the very opposite of the pragmatism claimed for those supports.

Has she said anything to rebut my overarching argument that the mixed strategy offers greater benefit/protection than the intrinsic strategy? Not a whit. By “pragmatic” she presumably means having greater practical effect for animals, but she has not supported her case effectively, nor rebutted my central argument that shows quite the converse (not that that argument was available to her in the formalized version presented in this installment).

11. I earlier pointed out that it is *ethically virtuous* to be concerned about human health and the environment. She claims we must choose where to place resources and emphasis. True, but she has not rebutted my virtue argument, nor my thought that it is *best* to use resources and emphasis to include extrinsic appeals. She is once more begging the question at this point. She points out it is *also* virtuous to argue that speciesism is evil. True, but so what? I argue much the same thing.

All of Dr. Perlo’s attempts to respond to my criticisms fail in my estimation.

VI. Dr. Perlo's Two New Arguments

To Dr. Perlo's credit, she has come up with a few new arguments in favor of her intrinsic strategy. To be thorough, I feel constrained to consider them:

1. She claims to cite evidence that the intrinsic strategy works. She notes that the Swiss include the dignity of animals in their laws. So what? I also advocate animal rights, so this is irrelevant to the key issue of *excluding extrinsic appeals*. She mentions this fact was cited by someone opposing vivisection on scientific grounds, *reinforcing* the inclusion of extrinsic appeals. A cat farm breeding victims for vivisection was closed down relying mainly on cruelty to cats rather than scientific fraud. Again, I would also emphasize the cruelty, but pointing out the scientific problems with vivisection would have been another problem for this "farm," and it would be remiss to ignore such a hugely influential appeal. After an Animal Rights Day protest, some monkeys were released. Again, I use animal rights arguments too. She gives many more examples. The same irrelevance prevails because I also campaign for animal rights and she ignores the benefits to the animals of the extrinsic appeals to her logical peril. She offers *nothing* in the examples to show the insignificance, impotence, irrelevance, or anything else negative about extrinsic appeals. Thus she fails to make her case.
2. She claims that intrinsic-extrinsic campaigners attempt "to ingratiate ourselves with the mainstream." This is condescending. It makes people like me sound like obsequious cowards who try to curry favor from anyone with any degree of power or influence. I am an animal rights campaigner. Let the establishment deal with that. The prevailing powers are not "ingratiated" to me for such advocacy. But if the extrinsic arguments are sometimes more effective with the mainstream speciesists, I demand to know what is wrong with *adapting* to that fact? I reiterate at this point, at the risk of being tedious, that it is best for animals to secure the

most good and least bad for each and every one of them.

VII. Conclusion: The State of the Debate

I would like now to briefly consider, in overview: (1) Dr. Perlo's initial article; (2) my response; (3) her response to me; and (4) the above continuation of this discussion. We are in conflict. To me, this is a struggle over trying to secure what is best for animals. I think I have clearly illuminated how her approach is less than best, although the intrinsic strategy will have some good effects (as will my approach which *shares* the animal rights component). She has not in the least bit refuted my argument for intrinsic-extrinsic strategy. On the contrary, it confuses matters to have a title implying that the whole thing turns on fundamentalism or pragmatism. Even she admits she is not being fundamentalist in effect, and she fails to show that her approach is more *pragmatic* (which in this context I interpret to mean *practically effective for animals*). She neglected eight of my rebuttals to most of her own arguments. Selective or conveniently narrowed focus also appears in other of her remarks (see especially 3. and 9. in Section V). As for instances in which she takes issue with what I have written, the following logical problems are present in each one as follows:

1. She *begs the question* in implying that we do not need to offer audiences additional incentives to abandon meat-eating.
2. She commits the *fallacy of irrelevance* by informing us that her earlier statement that it is always wrong to hurt or kill animals is part of a debate over animal abuse. Right—so what? It is still an erroneous statement in *any* context of debate.
3. She makes a useful distinction between intrinsic argument and intrinsic concerns (while falsely claiming that I equivocate between the two) and then simply *ignores* how intrinsic concerns can be furthered by extrinsic appeals.

4. She *begs the question* by reaffirming that my approach entails a credibility loss, implying there is something wrong with my sort of argument although she shows no flaws whatsoever.
5. She reaffirms how vivisection as poor science involves confusion or conflicting claims but *begs the question* by failing to substantiate this claim, in the face of my clarification that no confused or conflicted thinking need be involved at all.
6. She commits the *fallacy of irrelevance* by indicating that audience may be critical of scientific arguments against vivisection. So what? She simply dismisses these influential arguments as part of her general nay-sayer's approach.
7. She indicates that people such as me will not denounce speciesism as often, prominently or "analytically" as people who follow her approach. This could be perceived as insulting, but rather assumes that there would be a structural incapacity to conduct academic inquiry or to educate others if there is more to one's message. This is simply a *dubious empirical claim* that does not concede the need to deliver a broad-based message as effectively as possible. On the contrary, given her *excessively narrow focus*, her approach guarantees that she will not broach extrinsic appeals either often or in sufficient depth.
8. She *begs the question* by asserting, but not defending, how animals would not care about extrinsic appeals if they could understand them. My argument dictates otherwise.
9. She shows *bias* by stressing cases in which extrinsic arguments fail wholly or by degrees, simply ignoring the many success stories.
10. She *begs the question* by calling her approach more "pragmatic" for animals.

11. She *begs the question* by saying it is an issue as to how to place resources and what to emphasize in campaigning, without providing evidence that we should follow her line. She commits the *fallacy of irrelevance* in pointing out that it is virtuous to point out that speciesism is evil—so do intrinsic-extrinsic campaigners if they have anything like integrity.

Dr. Perlo then offers two new sorts of arguments. One provides evidence of animal rights appeals working, which is *irrelevant* because I also use such arguments. She needs to show that extrinsic appeals are *not* part of what is best—a negative burden as it were—but utterly fails to do this. Finally, she resorts to the *ad hominem fallacy* by painting mixed strategists such as myself as trying to “ingratiate” ourselves to “the mainstream.” That is not only false and distasteful since I advocate radical animal rights, but *begs the question*. Why should mainstream effectiveness be dismissed?

This completes my review of the first four segments of this exchange of ideas (including the present one). I conclude that an intrinsic-extrinsic strategy is by far the best approach, even if her grossly flawed articulation of intrinsic strategy retains certain merits. To me, the chief positives in what she presents are twofold. First, she stresses the value of advocating *animal rights* when people are sometimes excessively self-censoring about such advocacy. Second, she formulates a valuable new distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic appeals, which helps us to think much more lucidly and in depth about a key aspect of animal protection strategy. For these and other contributions I would like heartily to thank Dr. Perlo.

As for the actual fundamentalism versus pragmatism debate, I welcome the fundamentalists to engage my responses to their arguments in my aforementioned article, “Animal Rights Law.” Dr. Perlo’s unfortunate title might have attracted the interest of those interested in this much more prevalent animal rights debate about tactics. In the almost two years since the publication of my critique, the fundamentalists have not put a single dent in my arguments, whereas I have won over several of a Francione-type bent who have written to me in gratitude for—in their opinion—laying to waste their former fundamentalist positions. Do the fundamentalist

arguments terminate in dead-ends as I think I have shown? Can they introduce new arguments that will turn the tables? I doubt it, but if they do not even try, people will often think or at least suspect that they lack what it takes to make an effective response.